


John Golder  
Jan 1989

Mr Scott Harding—

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A N  
E S S A Y  
ON THE  
D I S T I N C T I O N  
BETWEEN THE  
SOUL and BODY of MAN.



A N  
E S S A Y  
O N T H E  
D I S T I N C T I O N  
B E T W E E N T H E  
S O U L a n d B O D Y o f M A N.

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By JOHN ROTHERAM, M. A.

Rector of Houghton-le-spring, Vicar of Seaham, and  
Chaplain to the Right Reverend John  
Lord Bishop of Durham.

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
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*NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE:*

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MDCCLXXXI.





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A N  
E S S A Y  
O N T H E  
D I S T I N C T I O N  
B E T W E E N T H E  
S O U L a n d B O D Y o f M A N.

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A N attentive observer will discover some properties in Matter that are fugitive and variable; others fixed and permanent under every condition and circumstance. By remarking these he will come at length to distinguish the native properties that belong to it as matter, from the adventitious and assumed. After passing through a thousand changing appearances, the Proteus hath been bound at last in the Chain of Experiment,

ment, and made to discover itself in its real form to the eye of the Philosopher; who hath thus been enabled to investigate the natural *inactivity* of matter amidst that infinite variety of *action* in which it is perpetually engaged. Susceptible alike of every motion, it is in itself devoid of the power of motion. It receives indifferently, and obeys implicitly every outward impulse, without manifesting any tendency of its own, any power of self-direction. It is therefore possessed of no such power, or never exerts it, which amounts to the same thing. For a power ever latent, and therefore ever useless, is not admitted in true philosophy.

The natural inactivity of matter qualifies it however for being acted upon. Without the power of moving itself, it is most moveable. Inert, and  
devoid

devoid of all absolute and essential power, it became the more apt to receive the relative powers. Such are those of Attraction and Repulsion, the powerful springs which first actuated, and ever since keep in motion, the various parts of the material system. Whether these powers are originally distinct, or are the result of one general law, by which every particle of matter has a tendency to every other particle, they may properly be considered as relative powers ; because their action and effect depend upon an outward relation. They could never give motion to a single and solitary particle of matter. But let others be produced, and then these powers which seem not to reside separately in any, will appear in the influence they have over all.

It is by these powers that matter is conducted through that endless variety of

forms which we see it assume. By them it is led through the maze of infinite combinations in which it never ceases to run; the alternate labour of generation and dissolution; whereby corruption becomes fruitful, and one set of beings arises in succession on the ruins of another. It is by these that inanimate nature seems in some measure to be enlivened, and teems with unnumbered classes of mineral and vegetable productions. It is by these that the wonderful process of vegetation is carried on, and the plant is made to pass successively through the state of increase, maturity, and decay. By these the materials are constructed into tubes, and woven into leaves; the fluid ascends, perspires, or subsides; the various secretions are performed, and the nutritive particles selected and assimilated.

What

What some have thought proper to dignify with the title of the Soul of Plants, seems indeed to be no more than the united action of those attractive and repulsive powers with which the several parts of the plant, in common with all other matter, are endued. For what else is a plant than a structure raised by an assemblage and arrangement of suitable materials? and what other operation does this require than the attraction of certain parts, and the separation of others?

The soul of plants then, if the expression may be used, seems to be no more than a particular application of that general power which is diffused throughout the whole mass of matter. It is no Genius created to animate and inform the plant; no Dryad that dwells in the Oak. The mutual influence of the parts

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concerned in the production of the plant, is by their peculiar situation determined to that harmonious effect, which gives birth to so admirable a structure.

As this active power does not spring with the plant, so neither can it be said to perish with it. It is not extinguished nor dissipated into air, but subsists as truly in the withering leaf as in the vigorous bud; in the dust to which the plant is reduced, as in the seed from which it springs. That particular arrangement of the parts which constitutes a plant is destroyed. But neither the matter which composed the body, nor the power which was called the soul of the plant is lost. The same power erects the same materials into a fabric of a different kind. The ashes of one plant yield nourishment to another; and that attractive force which lately compacted the  
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the fibres of a vegetable, now petrifies them into a stony mass, or works them perhaps into the substance of an animal.

Amidst all the admirable forms into which matter, aided by this plastic power, is wrought, it seems however that the whole operation of this power consists merely in giving motion and direction to matter; in drawing together or dispersing its finest particles. It follows that this power is dependent on matter, and cannot subsist in a state of separation from it. For of a power which consists in giving certain motions or positions to matter, what conception can we form if matter is abstracted? Or what can remain of a power founded on a relation, when the relation itself is taken away?

Let

Let us see if we shall be led to the same conclusion with regard to the Soul of Man; if its powers be also relative, and dependent on matter.

We are conscious within ourselves of an active power; a power that does not, like those we have been already considering, depend on any precarious situation of things without; that does not become more intense or more languid by the approach or recess of the bodies that surround us. We begin motion, encrease, retard, and direct it from our own determination alone. We are sovereign and arbitrary in the exercise of this power, not moved by any foreign impulse, nor waiting the concurrence of outward bodies. This is not then a relative, but an inherent power, and hath its origin wholly within ourselves.

Where



Where shall we say that a power like this resides? Is it a power superadded to that portion of matter of which our bodies are framed, and associated with those other properties which it hath in common with the whole inanimate mass? Such an association seems at first sight unnatural, and hardly reconcileable with the ways of infinite wisdom in the management of the creation. Things are adapted to certain ends, and regularly applied to them. Properties are not given, removed, and exchanged in a new and arbitrary manner; they are neither introduced where they did not originally subsist, nor eradicated where they were at first implanted. It is no deviation from this regular plan that the same matter is wrought into very different bodies, and enters perhaps by turns into the service of every element. This is

no more than a display of the same properties under different circumstances : the change is here superficial and accidental, arising from some new combination or connection, and still carried on in subserviency to those general laws which were at first established.

But let us consider what passes within ourselves. If we examine our own bodies, we find them to be constructed of vulgar materials. The matter with which they are enlarged, supported, and repaired, is common matter, the flesh of animals, or the vegetable productions of the earth. It is reasonable to think that the same common nourishment supplies all parts of our bodies, even those of the most exquisite workmanship. But to complete the experiment, let us view them in ruins. We here have access to the most concealed parts ; we trace every secret chan-

channel, and inspect the innermost recesses, the strong holds of life. If our own scrutiny hath not penetrated far enough, corruption will at length give us full satisfaction. That nice Anatomist suffers nothing to escape him. He analyses the minutest parts, and shews whereof the structure is made, by reducing the whole to dust, common dust, which goes to feed a blade of grass, or is kneaded into a lump of clay.

Such is the body of man in its origin, and in its fall. Plants derive their substance from the earth. On these we feed, and our bodies repay again to the earth what the vegetable had borrowed from it. Such is the circulation. There are no traces of this active principle in the matter from which our bodies are prepared, no remains of it in that into which they are resolved.

If then we hold that power with which we are endowed above the common mass to be no more than a property of matter, how shall we account for its appearance only at the time when it composes our bodies? Shall we say that the active principle was in reality still inherent in some finer matter, but being encumbered and oppressed by the grosser parts was hindered from exerting itself, and thus remained latent in the common mass: that it is prepared and partly disentangled in the course of vegetation, and at last entirely set free in the animal state: but that after a short enjoyment of liberty, by its concurrence with grosser matter it is again enveloped, and once more sunk and buried in common earth? This hypothesis having not yet been embraced need not be refuted. It brings us back however to another,  
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which hath been already mentioned, and which, though it hath its favourers, does not seem to stand more clear of difficulties. For can it be thought probable that a portion of matter taken from the common mass should be for a while invested with a property entirely new, and soon after despoiled of it? This is a singularity breaking through the established order of things, a violation of that uniformity which beautifies and gives an union to the various parts of the creation. According to this hypothesis, matter is taken out of its natural state, is made to act for a while a part superior to itself, and then again degraded, and returned back to its humbler original. A double violence to nature. For the irregularity is equal: to give the new property, and to destroy it.

Some

Some urge the objection still farther. They say that the superaddition of this remarkable quality is not only unnatural but impossible. For how can that which is constitutionally inactive be endowed with a principle of action? It must be confessed indeed that matter cannot be at the same time active and inert; naturally indisposed to action, and yet master of an inward power of self direction. One of these qualities must ever exclude the other. This at least therefore seems to be certain, that the constitution of matter must be altered to prepare it for the reception of this new power. Enough to load the hypothesis we are at present considering with an high degree of inconsistency.

For if we content ourselves with observing what Omnipotence does, without  
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out attempting to determine what it can do, the supposed change in matter can hardly appear natural. To deprive it of its distinguishing inactivity; to furnish it with a principle that contradicts its first character; again to reverse the change, to sink it from this new elevation, and to leave it once more inactive: is such a confusion of properties as can hardly be reconciled to the ways of creative wisdom, whatever may seem possible to creative power.

But we are not distinguished from common matter by a principle of self direction only. This may perhaps seem less remote from the capacity of matter, since whatever the principle itself may be its operation has a manifest relation to matter. If matter cannot  
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of itself begin to move, it is however susceptible of motion.

But we are endowed with other powers to which matter seems not to have even the most distant relation. For what have extension, figure, and motion to do with perception, and all the powers of thinking? Matter may furnish all that we admire in the visible creation; but we can never conceive it to be the basis of a thought, or the substance of an idea.

We can easily apprehend that every visible part of our frame was constructed from it; we can discern it throughout all the wonderful organization of our bodies, twisted into fibres, woven into membranes of the most delicate texture, formed into tubes of admirable fineness, and flowing through these chan-



channels in streams of the subtlest fluid: nay more, we can conceive it in the touch to excite the nervous papillæ; in the hearing to strike in undulations differently modulated on the tympanum of the ear; in vision, to flow in streams of light from every illuminated object, to be refracted through the humid chrystal of the eye, and with an inimitable pencil to draw on that web of admirable texture which is stretched out behind it, the images of every thing around us: we can conceive the peculiar system of nerves belonging to each of these organs to be put in motion, and the vibrations to be propagated through an elastic solid or fluid to the brain:—all this we can conceive: but when we would proceed a step beyond this we are lost. We seem to be arrived at the edge of a precipice where matter with its solidity can sup-  
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port us no farther. For what is this elastic spring, this playing of the fibres, this agitation of our whole frame, to sense and perception? We are arrived at a new creation, an ideal world, whose furniture and whose laws are totally different from the material.

Can we then believe that it is still the same substance which we discover under all these new appearances? Can it be matter which thinks, the same matter which we borrow from the earth and pay back to it again? No wonder that it hath been often mistaken for a new substance. Nothing can be more different from itself. Those well-known properties disappear by which it was become familiar to us, and it is furnished with others of a new character. If it be in reality matter which appears at one time solid, extended, figured, and moveable;

able ; at another, feels pleasure and pain, perceives, wills, and reasons ; we must allow at least that it is in this latter state a very different kind of matter from what it is in the former ; a matter which retains nothing but the name.

Shall we then take refuge in an hypothesis which entertains us with this strange transmutation of matter ; which supposes it to be stripped of its native qualities and invested with such as are utterly foreign to it ; whilst another more simple and natural lies open before us ?

Where there is an assemblage of properties and powers accompanying each other, inseparable, and always appearing in strict and intimate union, we suppose them to inhere in some common subject. For properties must be the properties of something. The subject to which these

united properties belong, and by which they are supported, is called the substance or substratum.

When there are two distinct assemblages of properties and powers, connected amongst themselves, but without any certain common connection, it seems most natural to suppose that they are two distinct substances.

We observe certain qualities in whatever we see or touch, and discern a natural connection amongst them. Extension leads to solidity, or the exclusion of every other body from that space which it already fills. With this is connected mobility, or a capacity of filling successively any other equal part of space; and divisibility, or a separation of the parts of solid extension; with all the train of properties depending on  
figure

figure and motion. To these united qualities, or to their common support, we give the general name of matter, or material substance.

We have within ourselves qualities and powers of a very different kind. We perceive and feel, we think, reflect, desire, and choose. Perception is the source of ideas. The mind compares them, marks their relations, retains, recalls, and variously combines them. Upon these are exercised memory, imagination, reason and judgment; and by these are awakened instincts, passions, and will. Their influence is reciprocal, they mutually incite, check, and regulate each other. These properties and powers, entirely distinct from the former association, but united amongst themselves, seem to have a claim no less just than the former to be considered as  
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a distinct substance. To these therefore, or to their common support, by a negative term of distinction from the former substance, is given the name of immaterial substance; or, in one word, by a positive expression, the name of Spirit.

And this on the same principles as in the former case. There are two combinations of qualities, of characters totally different and distinct from each other. The connection running through each is clear and acknowledged by all. We discover by sense the union amongst the material qualities; by consciousness the union amongst the mental. But neither sense nor consciousness inform us of any property, power, or quality that they possess in common. We gain our intelligence concerning them from different quarters. All our information concerning the properties of matter comes from  
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without; concerning the spiritual powers from within. They are therefore differently derived and of different descent. They do not branch out from one common stock, nor can we trace them up to the same original. They are of two different families, distinct, unallied, and independent on each other. And he, who, beginning first to combine into a substance the material qualities, should say that the spiritual are superadded; may with just as much reason begin by establishing the combination of spiritual powers, and suppose the material to be added.

It is true they are in the person of man united. But their union is the contracted union of two different substances; not the union of kindred properties in the same substance.

By

By virtue of this mysterious union they act upon each other. But their reciprocal action, with every other circumstance, tends to mark their different nature. The mind *wills*, and matter is *put in motion*. Matter is *impressed upon the senses*, and the mind *feels*. Can the powers acting be of the same nature, where both the action and the effect are so widely different? For whether we consider the action as beginning in the mind or terminating in it, both the action and the result appear essentially to differ from that which proceeds from or terminates in matter.

If the mind be material, then by the action of matter upon the mind, nothing could be produced but what matter could effect acting upon matter. That is, the effect would be merely mechanical.



chanical. If that were the case, the impression upon the mind would be a subject of mathematical calculation; the effect would be certain and invariable; and NEWTON would have discovered the laws of action between body and mind with the same truth and precision as he has done the laws of motion.

Matter acts upon matter by motion and impulse. Matter in motion acting upon matter by impulse seems incapable of producing any other effect than to change its form, to give motion or to destroy it, to accelerate or to retard. The external matter gives a certain motion or configuration to the organ of sense. The organ by its fibres or its fluid may make a similar impression upon the material mind, or give it a similar motion. But no other effect can arise, unless you suppose a new and unknown

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kind

kind of matter, acting by laws entirely different from all known matter, and possessing different and unknown powers: that is, matter differing in every respect from what is understood by the name of matter.

But if the effect produced upon the mind by the action of matter be only a change of motion or form, then sensation can be no more than such a change; and an idea produced by sensation can be no more than some particles of the mind put into motion or form. Accordingly, they who have laboured to prove the mind material, have framed two hypotheses; endeavouring to account for all sensation by Impression and Vibration.

On either supposition the effect would be determined by the force of the impulse;

pulse; and that being given, both the vigour and the duration of the idea might be exactly measured. The Impression would be superficial or deep, the vibration would be strong or weak in proportion to the force with which the object strikes upon the sense. And the sensation or idea, if we suppose it an effect purely material, would follow the same law.

But this Theory is contrary to all experience. For the same object presented to the sense produces effects different according to the disposition of the mind itself, and not merely according to the force or power of the object. The mind itself has a power of applying or withdrawing its attention, and thereby of encreasing or diminishing the effect, and of lengthening the impression at pleasure, or speedily effacing it. We behold one

moment with delight an object, which at another we look upon with indifference, or turn away from with aversion and disgust. Without regard to the strength or weakness of the impression the mind itself can generally determine its duration. It can retain the idea, however excited, long after the object hath ceased to act, and far beyond the measure of its action. It can lengthen the delight produced by the gentler vibrations of the softest sounds, or by the sight of polished and elegant forms; whilst it soon dismisses the image of rough and ill-proportioned bodies, and forgets the harsher tones of discordant music. It can retain the colouring laid on by the pencil of the softer violet tints; and efface the image drawn by the fiercer ray of red.

So

So that the time of the idea is in many cases entirely in the power of the mind: which could not be if the idea were merely an image impressed upon matter, or a vibration excited in some elastic body. For then, if the mind be a substance vibrating and elastic, the idea would be commensurate to the stroke received through the organ of sense. It would necessarily follow the law of its vibration, and being at first vigorous and strong, would grow fainter and weaker as the oscillations are shortened, and diminish by a regular scale from the point of impulse to the point of rest.

If an idea be called an impression of matter upon matter, similar conclusions will follow. If the impression be made upon matter fluid or soft, it would disappear either instantly or gradually, and  
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the idea would accompany it through its changes from deep and strong, to faint and evanescent. If upon an harder substance, or one yielding to receive the impression, and hardening to retain it, then our ideas would be fixed as characters engraven on a rock. But nothing resembling these laws, either of regular and gradual weakening from the time of impulse to the point of evanescence, or of forcible possession and stubborn duration, hath ever been observed to take place with regard to ideas. They are not subject to the laws of motion: their duration is not determinable by momentum and impulse: the mind itself has a power, in many cases arbitrary, to retain or dismiss them; by applying or withdrawing its attention to strengthen or subdue them; to support them for some time in equal degrees of vivacity; or to cause them suddenly  
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to disappear in undiminished force and vigour.

If an idea be a vibration, then it may be asked, wherein consists the idea of a vibration itself? Vibrations are supposed to represent every other object, what is it that represents this universal representative? If a vibration; then is it a vibration of a vibration, and the idea is confounded with its object.

If it be said that an inward vibration is the fittest representative of an outward, then how can it represent any thing besides a vibration? For to represent any other object it must be differently modified. But vibrations are distinguished only by quicker or slower, by the greater or less extent of their oscillations. On this supposition, ideas would all be substantially the same, differing only in  
their



their modes and circumstances. On this supposition, the ideas of every sense would coincide; and the idea of a rose would be distinguished from the idea of a musical sound only by its degrees of velocity: that is, it would be distinguished by a mode whereof it seems by no means to be susceptible.

If vibrations may be applicable to any class of Ideas, they should seem most naturally to belong to the ideas of hearing. For by hearing alone the effect of vibrations is perceived. From vibrations the eye and the touch perceive nothing but silent motion. To the ear alone they become vocal and sonorous.

But if the perception of sound be no more than the vibration of some inward elastic body correspondent to that of the  
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outward elastic by which it is excited, then wherein 'do the two vibrations differ? If they differ no otherwise than as the vibration of two different strings in unison, then is the inward, like the outward, a mere vibration; all is silence still; and the mind is as far from the perception of sound as the musical chord. A vibrating chord is not sound, it is merely a chord in motion. Sound therefore cannot be awakened in the mind without something beyond the power of mere vibration.

But if mere vibration cannot account for the ideas of hearing, its own appropriated organ, through which its chief effects are produced; how must this doctrine be applied to the ideas of every other sense, with which we are not sure that vibrations have any connection or concern?

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If the mind be matter it must be extended over a certain space; it must have figure and dimensions, be a superficies or a solid, bounded by lines or surfaces. Every idea must occupy a part of this space, from which every other idea will be excluded.

If a mere surface, plain or concave, it may be overspread with a picture of outward objects beautiful and just, but can give 'no exact representation of solid bodies. If this picture be called an assemblage of ideas, then it remains to be enquired wherein this picture differs from any other picture? If it differ not, how is it more than a picture, and how are its images perceived and felt?

If solid matter, either an entire solid, or a solid surrounding a vacuum, then  
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the representation of objects in all their dimensions may be molded in the solid itself, or may be introduced into the included vacuum, as the furniture in a room. These solid representations must be of a texture hard and firm, else how can the mind retain its ideas? Yet they must be sufficiently soft and yielding instantly to admit of new shapes, else how shall we account for the quick succession and change of ideas? What becomes of the old furniture when new is continually introduced? In what hidden cells are these solid ideas lodged, that they may be produced again in good repair when wanted to fill the apartments of memory? What gives life to these figures; and how are they perceived and felt?

For, not to dwell on the difficulties that meet us in the way, let it be allowed that by the action of groffer bo-

dies without upon some finer matter within, compleat pictures or images may be formed, perfectly corresponding with the external object, pursuing it in every motion, and reflecting every change of form. You have then found a Microcosm ; a miniature world of matter ; a hidden repository of forms perfectly agreeing with the outward forms. But still the question recurs, how are these forms perceived ? The forms within are no more perception themselves, than the forms without. They are still no more than material forms, the sense and perception of which is wanting.

For, in a word, the question is not about the production of images or forms, but about the sense and perception of them. We are not in search of matter figured, moving, or at rest. That we find in the material world without. Nor  
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of those images and representations of outward bodies which are prepared by the organs of sense: but our enquiry is after sense itself.

If sense be said to be nothing more than matter figured and moving, then sense differs not from the world without us; and every external object, having all the requisites of sense, is itself sentient. If sense be nothing more than the true images and representations of outward objects, such as are believed to be formed by the organs of sense, then the pictures of outward objects formed on the retina of the eye will be sense, as much as any picture or representation of the same object formed in the brain, or in that matter, wherever lodged, which is called mind.

So

So that in this supposition these three things, in themselves most distinct, are confounded : the outward material world ; the organ through which it is perceived ; and the power perceiving.

Allow the material object striking upon the organ of sense to produce in that matter which is called mind, its compleat resemblance ; this image formed within, however true and perfect, can be no idea till it be perceived. For if a compleat image of an external object be an idea though not perceived, then the pictures on the retina of the eye are ideas. Perception therefore cannot be accounted for, without the assistance of some new powers, differing from, and surpassing all the known powers of matter.

Per-

Perception is the first and lowest operation of the mind. If then the action of matter upon matter cannot account for the formation and perception of the ideas of sense, how will it account for all the higher operations of the mind? ideas of sense are but the first elements of thought: and the produce raised from these elements by the operation of the mind upon them is as far superiour to the elements themselves in variety, copiousness and use, as books are to the characters of which they are composed. How shall he who is ignorant of the use of letters, write an history, or a poem? If matter acting upon matter cannot account for the production of the elementary ideas, how can it account for all that is accomplished by the action of the mind upon them?

What

What is it that recalls, compares, and combines them; that marks their connections and distinctions; that arranges, classes, and reduces them into order? What is it that reflects and reasons, that wills, deliberates, and determines; that sees in the agreement of ideas self evident truths, and starting from these first principles, pursues a train of reasoning to its remotest consequences: that, taking its departure from a falling leaf, rises to the heavens; descends again to the deep; penetrates through the whole œconomy of nature; and brings to light the universal law which agitates the ocean in its bed, directs the earth in its motion, and guides all the heavenly bodies in their courses? Is all this no more than some impression or repercussion of matter upon matter? Is reflection the pulse of some musical chord; and phi-

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lofophic reasoning the full harmony of  
tuneful vibrations?

An attempt hath been made to account for the higher operations of the mind by the power of affociation. It is true the ideas of things often recur to the mind in the fame order and connection in which they were firft prefented to the fenfe: and the fight, or the recollection of one object, though now fingle, introduces into the mind another, or a train of other objects, with which it was formerly connected.

And did things always appear in the fame rank and order in which they were firft made known to us, there might be fome colour of reafon for the fuppoftion that an involuntary affociation was the

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cause of all the mind's subsequent operations upon its ideas.

But this is not the case. The mind has a power over its own associations. It can alter the first disposition of its ideas, so as to separate, transpose, and invert them: it can range and marshal them in new order, and by a variety of changes and evolutions, can throw them into forms and combinations before unknown.

When a Commander changes the order of his army, he conceives in his mind the new arrangement before he directs the execution; forming his design from the nature of the ground they are to occupy, or the disposition of the army against which they are to be led. The new arrangement may be totally different from any that he had seen before, and  
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in that case, cannot be the mechanical effect of former impressions. For though he had seen lines and ranks, yet he had never seen a whole army in all its parts drawn forth in the order in which he now designs to form it. Therefore this design cannot be produced merely by the force of former associations, but by the power of the mind over its former associations.

The case is the same in a thousand other instances, in every science, and every art. The Grammarian in the arrangement of his rules; the Logician of his syllogisms; the Philosopher of his arguments; the Poet of his machinery and plan; may all pursue a method different from any whereof they had before seen an example. If this were not the case, there would be an end of all invention. The Painter must for ever

trace over again the lines of preceding Masters; and the Statuary could only work after a former model. All would be imitation; there could be no invention, no fiction, none of the lively and striking forms of imagination. The utmost effort of the mind would be a bare and naked representation of things as they are: fancy must lay aside her works, and cease from her boldest flights: she could no longer kindle the fire of enthusiasm in the Poet's breast; no longer give life to the marble, or the canvas: all her enchanting visions would be dissolved, and all her new creations unpeopled.

But this is not all.

There is a natural connection between the outward objects of sense, and the ideas excited by them; and a natural  
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affociation takes place between the ideas of objects which nature hath connected.

The mind not only commands these affociations, (as hath appeared) but it creates new affociations, arbitrary and of its own invention, and not copied from any example in the external works of nature. And with these, as with new instruments of its own contrivance, it performs several works of admirable utility and beauty.

Sounds excite ideas, but ideas of sound only, and of the sounds by which they are excited. The mind of man hath directed that a new affociation, and one without example in the works of nature, shall take place between sounds and ideas before utterly strangers to each other: so that sounds, under this new direction, not only raise ideas of sounds

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corresponding with the natural sound itself, but of any other sound entirely different from itself; and not only of sounds different from itself, and of all the objects of the sense of hearing, but still farther of things wherewith sound hath no natural connection, and of all the objects of every other sense. By which means arbitrary sounds are made to excite every idea of the mind, and by means of ideas to represent every part of nature.

In a way similar to this, new associations unknown to nature are formed between our ideas and objects of sight.

Lines straight, angular, or curved, exhibited to the eye, naturally excite corresponding ideas. But by the appointment of the mind, new associations are formed, by means of which these lines  
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are made to raise the idea, not only of lines like themselves, but of every other line: and not of lines only, but of surfaces, solids, and every object of sight: and still farther, not of the objects of sight alone, but of all the objects of every other sense.

And thus have languages both vocal and written been produced. Sounds not naturally significant are invested with meaning; and lines are taught to express the images of things whereof they have no resemblance. To these arbitrary associations do we owe the benefit of language, by means of which the ideas and conceptions of our mind are rendered audible to those who are near us, and visible to those who are at a distance.

Without this contrivance the communication between man and man must  
have



have been carried on in the most imperfect manner; by means only of the few sounds and signs which are naturally significant, and by just delineations of things which few could execute. Whereas by words and writing a free intercourse between different minds is opened; our meaning is fully and clearly expressed by that which bears to it no natural resemblance; our thoughts are fixed and embodied, and science unimpaired is delivered down from age to age. The events, the designs, the characters of the primitive ages are made known to modern times; all antiquity is brought forward to our view, and past generations of men live again in our sight. By this conveyance, the wisdom of ancient days saved from the wreck of ages, as a precious freight in a vessel well navigated through a long and perilous voyage, is delivered into our hands.

In



In like manner might the objects of the other senses be made universal representatives of the objects and ideas of all the senses. We might have a language of Tastes and Odours; and there might be an Alphabet of tangible as well as of visible elements.

Now since the mind itself has such a power over those associations which are natural, as either to disunite them, to change their disposition, or to form them into new combinations; and likewise possesses the farther power of creating, for its own use, endless new associations amongst things which are by nature utterly disjoined and unconnected: it cannot be that the activity and operations of the mind should spring from those associations over which it exercises a power absolute and supreme.

Matter acts upon matter by its solidity, figure, and motion. In these is contained its whole energy, and in these is summed up the whole effect.

But when it acts upon the mind, a variety of qualities, till then unknown, are first discovered. For to the mind it not only appears solid, figured, and moveable, but enriched with beautiful colours ; grateful to the taste ; perfumed with pleasant odours ; and yielding sweet harmonious sounds. So that all material objects, in themselves, and to each other, are dark and naked : to the mind alone they are cloathed in all the pleasing variety of sensible qualities.

Mind, like a bride from a nobler family, enriches matter by its union, and brings as a dower, possessions before unknown.

known. Henceforth matter appears clothed in a gayer and richer garment; and the fruits of this union are a new progeny, to which matter, confining its alliance to its own family, could never have given birth.

The mind is conscious of its own powers and properties; conscious of its power of perception, judgment, memory, and will.

If the mind were material, would it not likewise be conscious that it possessed the properties of matter? For a conscious being, it should seem, must be conscious of its own most intimate powers and properties.

But the mind is not conscious of its solidity or extension, its dimensions, or figure. On the contrary, whilst it is

conscious that it thinks, perceives, and wills, and that these powers are in itself, it seems, by its senses, to perceive, hardness, resistance, rough and smooth, out of itself. It has no notion or conception of these properties of matter but what it obtains by foreign information, derived from outward bodies through the organs of sense. By these channels alone the knowledge of matter and its properties is conveyed to the mind. Whereas if the mind itself were material, it should seem that its first acquaintance with the properties of matter should be by a knowledge of itself, and a contemplation of its own nature.

If the mind were material, and a power of thinking superadded, then one would expect that it should be more intimately conscious of that part of its nature which is original and fundamental,

tal, than of that which is additional and accessory. Whereas, on the contrary, that which is supposed to be additional and accessory, is the only part that is intimately known, and is the subject of consciousness; that which is said to be original, radical, and inherent is known only by sense. That is, it finds within itself a knowledge of its additional and dependent powers; the knowledge of its underived and essential properties must be sought for out of itself, and must be supplied by a correspondence and intercourse with distant and foreign bodies.

Consciousness, according to this supposition, instead of penetrating the soul, and entering into its very essence, seems only to touch its external parts, and to play upon its surface.

Upon

Upon the whole therefore : our own personal experience, and every direct observation that hath been made upon the mind itself ; together with the insufficiency of every other hypothesis to account for its operations by material and mechanical agency, tend to convince us, that the mind is not material ; but that joined to this organized body there is within us a different substance, an immaterial spirit, of an higher and diviner original, and endowed with better and superiour properties and powers.

When the outward object hath made its impresson, and stamped the idea, the passive organ hath then done its part, and the rest is accomplished by the presiding mind. Which, like a skilful artist, goes to work upon the materials furnished by the senses ; comparing, selecting

lecting, analysing, and abstracting; till by placing them in different points of view their fitness, relations, and dependencies are seen. Then the first rays of truth break in upon the mind; the principles of knowledge are established; and the powers of reason are employed. Led by the light of truths already known, new truths are daily discovered; the bounds of knowledge are gradually enlarged; and the mind is all enlightened.

A block of marble is hewn from the quarry, and brought to PHIDIAS a rude and shapeless mass. He works upon it, reduces it into shape, gives it form and proportion, and a beautiful statue is produced. Is PHIDIAS himself who performed the work, a fragment from a rock? and is the idea of beauty after  
which

which he worked no more than a marble image within him?

But the difference is much greater between the ideas of sense, the materials upon which the mind first begins its work, and the truths produced by its operations, than between the rough marble, and the statue formed by the skill of PHIDIAS.

Let matter then be allowed to furnish the first materials ; the enlightened mind, which by its operations upon these discovers truth, and pursues it through all its distant connections, must have powers as far superiour to that which gave the first impression, as PHIDIAS is superiour to the marble.









